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Implementation and Analysis of the
Nonlinear Decomposition Attack on
Polycyclic Groups
Yoongbok Lee
Abstract
Around two years ago, Roman’kov introduced a new type of attack called the non-
linear decomposition attack on groups with solvable membership search problem. To
analyze the precise efficiency of the algorithm, we implemented the algorithm on
two protocols: semidirect product protocol and Ko-Lee protocol. Because polycyclic
groups were suggested as possible platform groups in the semidirect product protocol
and polycyclic groups have a solvable membership search problem, we used poly-
cyclic groups as the platform group to test the attack. While the complexity could
vary regarding many different factors within the group, there was always at least one
exponential factor in the complexity analysis of the algorithm.
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Chapter 1
Public-key Cryptography
1.1 Key Exchange Protocol
Key exchange protocol is a way to share a secret key between two entities, namely
Alice and Bob. Since the key is only known to Alice and Bob, they can now encrypt
and decrypt messages with the key to make it hard for any adversary trying to obtain
the secret message. For a simple example, given that the shared key K is encoded
as a binary string of length n, Alice can compute mi ⊕K = ei for each substring of
m of length n (|mi| = n). Then Bob, after receiving the encrypted ciphertext e, can
compute ei⊕K = (mi⊕K)⊕K = mi⊕ (K⊕K) = mi for each i to obtain the secret
plaintext m.
Note that obtaining the value of the secret key K would imply that the adversary
can perform the same operation to obtain the plaintext m. Thus, obtaining the key is
equivalent to having an efficient way to break the cryptosystem. Even though there
could be many different methods on how to make use of the shared key, we will focus
on establishing the secret key assuming there is an effective use of the key to encrypt
or decrypt messages.
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1.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
The following description of Diffie-Hellman protocol is from the book Group Based
Cryptography by Myasnikov, Shpilrain, and Ushakov [12], where more details can be
found. From now on, we name the two sides of the key exchange protocol Alice and
Bob, respectively.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element g ∈ G.
2. Alice picks a random number a ∈ N and sends ga = g · g · · · g︸ ︷︷ ︸
a times
to Bob.
3. Bob picks a random number b ∈ N and sends gb = g · g · · · g︸ ︷︷ ︸
b times
to Alice.
4. Alice computes Kab = (g
b)a = gba = gab
5. Bob computes Kba = (g
a)b = gab
Thus we have the shared key K = Kab = Kba = g
ab. This protocol depends on the
hardness of the Diffie-Hellman Problem, which is finding gab from ga and gb. Note
that G and g have to be chosen carefully to avoid the adversary Eve from obtaining
the shared key efficiently. The kind of problem that recovers a from ga and g is called
the discrete logarithm problem, and using brute force to search for the shared key
requires time complexity of O(|g|), where |g| is the order of g.
1.3 Ko-Lee Protocol
The Ko-Lee protocol was first proposed by Ko, Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang, and Park
[9] on braid groups to apply the Diffie-Hellman key exchange on non-commutative
groups. Moreover, K.J. Gryak and D. Kahrobaei in [6] proposed that it could be a
plausible scheme with a polycyclic group as its platform group (the group where the
key exchange is performed), and the general procedure of the key exchange protocol
they proposed is below.
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1. A group G, an element g ∈ G, and subgroups A,B ⊆ G such that ab = ba for
all a ∈ A and b ∈ B are made public.
2. Alice chooses an element a ∈ A and then publishes ga.
3. Bob chooses an element b ∈ B and then publishes gb.
4. Since A and B commute element-wise, Alice and Bob have the shared key
gab = gba.
The conjugacy search problem is the following:
given a subgroup A = 〈a1, . . . , aq〉 in G, an element g ∈ G, and an element ga where
a ∈ A, find an expression of a in terms of a1, . . . , aq.
If an adversary can solve the conjugacy search problem, then he can break the system.
Thus the secrecy of the above scheme depends on the hardness of the conjugacy search
problem of the platform group.
1.4 ElGamal Cryptosystem
As in [?], the commonly used ElGamal encryption scheme (or the ElGamal Cryp-
tosystem) is an encryption protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman key establishment
protocol. The method goes as following:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G, and a generating element g ∈ G.
2. Alice, the receiver, picks a random natural number a as a private key.
3. Alice then publishes ga == g · g · · · g︸ ︷︷ ︸
a times
as her public key.
4. Bob, who wants to send Alice a shared secret m, picks a random natural number
b and computes m · (ga)b.
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5. Bob sends Alice two elements gb and m · (ga)b.
6. Alice recovers m by calculating (m · (ga)b)) · ((gb)a)−1 = m.
Using the common ElGamal cryptosystem that mainly depends on the discrete loga-
rithm problem for its security, we can modify the exponents (the secret keys) of Alice
and Bob to be the elements of the group. Kahrobaei and Khan [8] proposed a way to
adapt the ElGamal key encryption algorithm for cryptosystems in non-commutative
groups. The description of the scheme below is from the article by K.J. Gryak and
D. Kahrobaei [6]. For this cryptosystem, we assume there is a group G and finitely
generated subgroups A,B ⊆ G such that A and B commute element-wise, meaning
ab = ba for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
1. Bob chooses a random element g ∈ G. Then he picks his private key b ∈ B,
and publishes g and c = gb = b−1gb.
2. To establish a shared secret x ∈ G, Alice chooses x and her secret key a ∈ A
then publishes ga = a−1ga and y = xc
a
.
3. To recover the shared secret x, Bob computes (ga)b. Since the elements in A
and B commute, we get
(ga)b = b−1a−1gab = a−1b−1gba = (gb)a = ca (1.1)
Then Bob can retrieve the shared secret x by computing x = y(c
a)−1 . Note that the
security of this protocol depends on the hardness of the conjugacy search problem of
the platform group G.
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1.5 Semidirect Product Protocol
The key exchange using semidirect product was proposed by Kahrobaei, Koupparis,
and Shpilrain in [7]. Even though the general protocol seemed vulnerable to the linear
decomposition attack [10], it was suggested that the dimension might grow too large
for the attack to be efficient. Therefore, we discuss how the nonlinear decomposition
attack could work against this protocol. The outline of the protocol is described below.
Alice and Bob are going to work with following elements φ ∈ Aut(G), (φl, g) where
l ∈ N and g ∈ G. The former element is multiplied as: (φp, g)(φq, g) = (φp+q, φq(g)·g).
1. Alice picks a private integer m then computes (φ, g)m
= (φm, φm−1(g) . . . φ(g) · g). Then she sends gm = φm−1(g) . . . φ(g) · g to Bob.
2. Bob picks a private integer n then computes (φ, g)n = (φn, φn−1(g) . . . φ(g) · g).
Then she sends gn = φ
n−1(g) . . . φ(g) · g to Alice.
3. Alice computes (x, gn) · (φm, gm) = (x · φm, φm(gn) · gm). Then Alice’s key is
now KA = φ
n(gn) · gm. Note that since Alice does not know n, so she does not
know φn(:= x). Hence she does not calculate x · φm where x = φn, as she does
not need it to calculate KA.
4. Bob computes (x, gm) · (φn, gn) = (y · φn, φn(gm) · gn). Then Bob’s key is now
KB = φ
m(gm) · gn. Note that since Bob does not know m, so he does not know
φm(:= y). Hence he does not calculate y ·φn, as he does not need it to calculate
KB.
5. Alice and Bob now have the shared secret key
(φn, gn) · (φm, gm) = (φm, gm) · (φn, gn) = (φ, g)m+n = (φm+n, gm+n).
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Chapter 2
Polycyclic Groups
The security of the above protocols (except the semidirect product based protocol)
depend on the hardness of the conjugacy problem of the group. As polycyclic groups
have no known efficient solutions to the conjugacy decision and search problems, it
was suggested to fit as the platform group for those protocols. However, Roman’kov
claimed in [14] that the groups in which the membership search problem is efficiently
solvable can be vulnerable to the nonlinear decomposition attack. Since polycyclic
groups have efficient solutions to the membership search problem, we used them as
the platform groups to test the efficiency of the nonlinear decomposition attack. The-
orems and definitions in this chapter are from the book “Computation with Finitely
Presented Goups” by C.C. Sims [15]. More detailed proofs and background informa-
tion can be found in the book as well.
2.1 Polycyclic Groups
All kinds of groups can be a possible candidate to be a platform group. However,
finitely generated groups are most generally adopted, and finite groups are in practical
use. In the case of polycyclic groups, it was shown in [15] that all polycyclic groups
are finitely generated. Polycyclic groups can be infinite, but we mainly focused on
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finite polycyclic groups to limit the computation time in the implementation and
analysis stages.
2.1.1 Solvable and Nilpotent Groups
Before we discuss the properties of polycyclic groups, we need some background on
solvable and nilpotent groups as the basis. The background information on solvable
and nilpotent groups is in the appendix.
Definition 2.1.1. Define [G,H] = 〈g−1h−1gh|g ∈ G, h ∈ H〉. Then the derived
subgroup of G is G′ = G(1) = [G,G], and we recursively define G(i) = [G(i−1), G(i−1)].
The derived series of G is the sequence G(0) ⊇ G(1) ⊇ · · ·
Definition 2.1.2. Let γ1(G) = G, and we also recursively define γi+1(G) = [γi(G), G].
Then the lower central series of G is the sequence γ1 ⊇ γ2 ⊇ · · ·
Definition 2.1.3. A solvable group is a group where G(n) is trivial for some n, and
a nilpotent group is a group where γm is trivial for some m.
The smallest i (if it exists) such that G(i) = 1 is called the derived length of G.
The smallest j (if it exists) such that γj(G) = 1 is called the nilpotency class (or
just simply class) of G.
Proposition 2.1.4. Subgroups and quotient groups of solvable/nilpotent groups are
solvable/nilpotent.
Proposition 2.1.5. If G is a group, then the group G/G(i) is solvable with derived
length less than or equal to i. The group G/γj(G) is nilpotent of class at most j − 1.
Proposition 2.1.6. If N is normal in G and both N and G/N are solvable, then G
is solvable.
Proposition 2.1.7. Nilpotent groups are solvable.
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Proof. Suppose γi(G) = 1. By Corollary A.1.11, we have j such that G
(j) = 1 where
2j ≥ i.
Proposition 2.1.8. If G/G′ is generated by x1, . . . , xn, then γ2(G)/γ3(G) is gener-
ated by the images of [xj, xi] with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, under the natural homomorphism
f : G→ G/γ3(G).
Proposition 2.1.9. Suppose G/G′ is generated by a set X and Y ⊆ γi(G) where
i ≥ 2 such that the image of Y under the natural homomorphism to γi(G)/γi+1(G)
generates that group. Then γi+1(G)/γi+2(G) is generated by the image of
Z = {[y, x]|y ∈ Y, x ∈ X}.
Corollary 2.1.10. If G is generated by n elements and i ≥ 2, then γi(G)/γi+1(G) is
generated by (n− 1)i−1/2 elements.
Proposition 2.1.11. If N ≤ Z(G) and G/N is nilpotent, then G is nilpotent.
2.1.2 Polycyclic Groups
Definition 2.1.12. A polycyclic series of length n of a group G is a sequence
G = G1 . G2 . G3 . · · · . Gn−1 . Gn . Gn+1 = 1
where each group Gi/Gi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is cyclic. Any group with a polycyclic series is
called a polycyclic group, and the group G above is said to have a polycyclic length
of n.
Note that a group’s polycyclic series can have different lengths since one can
take different quotients for each i. However, the number of infinite quotients (where
Gi/Gi+1 is infinite) is the same for all polycyclic series. We call the number of infinite
quotients the Hirsch number of the group G.
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Proposition 2.1.13. Polycyclic groups are solvable.
Proposition 2.1.14. Finitely generated abelian groups are polycyclic.
Proposition 2.1.15. If N is normal in G and both N and G/N are polycyclic, then
G is polycyclic.
Proposition 2.1.16. If G has a polycyclic series of length n, then G can be generated
by n elements.
Proof. Suppose we have a polycyclic series G = G1 ⊇ G2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Gn+1 = 1. Then let
ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be an element in Gi such that aiGi+1 generates Gi/Gi+1. Then every
coset of Gi+1 in Gi contains a power of ai. Then if g ∈ G, g = aα11 g2, where g2 ∈ G2,
and similarly g2 = a
α2
2 g3, where g3 ∈ G3. So g = aα11 aα22 g3. Proceeding inductively,
we get g = aα11 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n gn+1 where gn+1 = 1. Therefore g = a
α1
1 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n , and thus
G is generated by a1, a2, . . . , an.
Remark 2.1.17. Note that by the above theorem, any element in G can be represented
as aα11 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n (αi ∈ Z).
Proposition 2.1.18. Quotient groups of polycyclic groups are polycyclic.
Proposition 2.1.19. Subgroups of polycyclic groups are polycyclic.
Corollary 2.1.20. If G has a polycyclic series of length n, then every subgroup of
G can be generated by n or fewer elements.
2.2 Polycyclic Presentations
Definition 2.2.1. Suppose we have a group G and a polycyclic series G = G1 ⊇
G2 ⊇ G3 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Gn−1 ⊇ Gn ⊇ Gn+1 = 1. Then let ai be an element of Gi whose
image in Gi/Gi+1 generates the group. Then the sequence a1, . . . , an is called the
polycyclic generating sequence of the group G.
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Definition 2.2.2. If G = 〈ai, . . . , an〉 as in Proposition 2.1.16, any element can be
written in a form aα11 . . . a
αn
n where the αj are integers. Let I = I(a1, . . . , an) denote
the set of subscripts i such that Gi/Gi+1 is finite, and mi = |Gi : Gi+1|, the order of ai
relative to Gi+1, if i is in I. Assuming no generating element is redundant (meaning
no ai is in Gi+1), we have mi > 1 for each i ∈ I. Then an element g ∈ G is in a
collected word if g = aα11 a
α2
2 . . . a
αn
n and each 0 ≤ αj < mj for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Then by the definition above, we can get relations
ajai = aia
αij,i+1
i+1 · · · aαij,nn ; j > i,
a−1j ai = aia
βij,i+1
i+1 · · · aβij,nn , j > i ; j /∈ I,
aja
−1
i = a
−1
i a
γij,i+1
i+1 · · · aγij,nn , j > i ; i /∈ I,
a−1j a
−1
i = a
−1
i a
δij,i+1
i+1 · · · aδij,nn , j > i ; i, j /∈ I,
amii = a
µi,i+1
i+1 · · · aµi,nn , i ∈ I,
a−1i = a
mi−1
i a
νi,i+1
i+1 · · · aνi,nn , i ∈ I,
where the right sides are collected words in G. The above relations are called the
standard polycyclic presentation relative to a1, . . . , an. If i ∈ I, since a−1i only
appears once in the set of relations above, we can remove the relation by adding
aia
−1
i = 1 on the relation when i /∈ I and by cancelling the left side by multiplying
ai on both sides when i ∈ I. Then the presentation after the operations is called the
standard monoid polycyclic presentation . Rewriting an element with respect
to a standard polycyclic rewriting system is called collection . Moreover, since the
collected forms are unique, the rewriting system is said to be confluent .
Proposition 2.2.3. Suppose G is defined by a polycyclic presentation with genera-
tors a1, . . . , an. Then G is polycyclic and a1, . . . , an is a polycyclic generating sequence
for G.
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2.3 Membership Search Problem
The membership search problem is the following: Given a subgroup H = 〈h1, . . . , ht〉
in G and an element h ∈ H, find an expression for h in terms of h1, . . . , ht.
Definition 2.3.1. Suppose G = 〈a1, . . . , an〉. Then, in a generating sequence U =
(g1, . . . , gs) of a subgroup H of G, let the collected form of gi be a
αi1
1 . . . a
αin
n
The s-by-n matrix A of the elements αij in i
th row and jth column is called the
associated exponent matrix of U . Also, we have the following elementary operations
on exponent matrices:
1. Interchange gi and gj, where i 6= j.
2. Replace gi with g
−1
i .
3. Replace gi with gig
α
j where α is an integer and i 6= j.
4. Add a new row gs+1 any element of 〈g1, . . . , gs〉
5. Remove gk if gk = 1
Note that none of the operations changes the subgroup 〈g1, . . . , gs〉, and we say the
sequences U and V are equivalent under elementary operations if one can be trans-
formed into another with a sequence of above operations.
Example 2.3.2. Given a sequence A = (g1g
4
2g3, g1g3, g
6
2), we can construct the cor-
responding exponent matrix U associated with A
U =

1 4 1
1 0 1
0 6 0

Definition 2.3.3. A sequence of elements U = (g1, . . . , gn) of G is said to be in
standard form if the associated exponent matrix A satisfies the following properties.
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• All rows of A are nonzero.
• A is row reduced over Z.
• If Aij is a corner entry and j ∈ I, then Aij|mj.
Example 2.3.4. Let G be the group generated by group elements
a1 =

1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

a2 =

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

a3 =

1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

a4 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

a5 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

a6 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1

Given a generating sequence U = (g1, g2, g3), where
g1 = a
2
1a
−1
2 a4,
g2 = a
3
3a4a6,
g3 = a
2
4a5a6.
Then, U is in standard form with the associated exponent matrix

2 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 3 1 0 1
0 0 0 2 1 1
 .
An admissible sequence of exponents for U is a sequcnce (α1, . . . , αs) of integers
such that if Aij is a corner entry and j ∈ I, then 0 < αj ≤ mj/Aij. Let E(U) denote
the admissible sequence of exponents for U , and let S(U) denote the set of products
of gα11 . . . g
αn
n where α1, . . . , αn ranges over E(U). S(U) is generally not a subgroup of
G, unless some conditions are satisfied which we will discuss later on in this paper.
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Proposition 2.3.5. Suppose U = (g1, . . . , gs) is a sequence of elements in G in
standard form, and (β1, . . . , βs), (γ1, . . . , γs) ∈ E(U). If gβ11 . . . gβss = gγ11 . . . gγss , then
βi = γi where 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
Proof. Let A be the exponent matrix associated with U , and let g = gβ11 . . . g
βs
s =
gγ11 . . . g
γs
s . If A1j is the corner entry of the first row and a
δ1
1 . . . a
δn
n is the collected
word of g, then δk = 0, where 1 ≤ k < j. Then we have two cases:
1. If j /∈ I, then Gj/Gj+1 is isomorphic to Z, and hence δj = A1jβ1 = A1jγ1. Since
A1j 6= 0, β1 = γ1.
2. If j ∈ I, then Gj/Gj+1 is isomorphic to Zmj and δj ≡ A1jβ1 ≡ A1jγ1 (mod mj).
But both β1 and γ1 are nonnegative and less than mj/A1j, so A1jβ1 and A1jγ1
are nonnegative and less than mj. Therefore A1jβ1 = A1jγ1 and β1 = γ1.
Thus, after the first step we can multiply g−β11 on both sides to get g
β2
2 . . . g
βs
s =
gγ22 . . . g
γs
s . Continuing inductively, we get βi = γi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
The above procedure in the proof of Proposition 2.3.3 gives us an algorithm to solve
the membership decision problem in S(U) of G. Throughout the process, consider
h = aβ11 . . . a
βn
n .
function POLY_MEMBER (U,g)
#U = sequence (g_1,...,g_s) of elements of G in standard form
#g = an element in G
(the function returns true if g is in S(U) and false otherwise.
A := exponent matrix of U;
h := g;
done := false;
for i in [1..s] do
if done break;
A_{ij} := corner entry of A in i-th row;
if some \beta_k != 0 for some (beta < j) then return false;
if A_{ij} does not divide \beta_j return false;
q := \beta_j / A_{ij};
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h := g_i^{-q}h;
od;
return (h = 1);
end;
Definition 2.3.6. Given a sequence U = (g1, . . . , gn) of elements of G in standard
form, U is full if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ s the set S(U) contains g−1i gjgi.
2. Let A be the associated exponent matrix of U . If Aij is a corner entry and
j ∈ I, then S(U) contains gqi where q = mj/Aij
Example 2.3.7. Consider the sequence U from Example 2.3.4. To make the sequence
full, we need to add the elements in the conditions above and iterate through the row
reduction process. The resulting associated exponent matrix of the full sequence is
A =

2 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 3 1 0 1
0 0 0 2 1 1
0 0 0 0 3 1
0 0 0 0 0 2

Now we can decide whether a sequence U and its acceptable set of exponents S(U)
is a subgroup of G.
Proposition 2.3.8. If U = (g1, . . . , gs) is a sequence of elements of G in standard
form, then S(U) is a subgroup of G if and only if U is full. If U is full, then the
sequence g1, . . . , gs is the polycyclic generating sequence of S(U).
Proposition 2.3.9. If H is a subgroup of G, then there is a unique sequence U =
(g1, . . . , gn) such that H = S(U).
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Now, suppose we have a subgroup H of G, generated by the sequence U =
(h1, . . . , hs). If we could transform U into standard form with a deterministic al-
gorithm, then we can solve the membership search problem on H using the above
algorithm POLY MEMBER.
We can first apply elementary row operations on the associated matrix A of U
to reduce it to row echelon form. Suppose hi and hj have the leading term a
β
k and
aγk, with |β| > |γ|. Replacing hi with hih−qj where q = bβ/γc, we can change the
exponent of the leading term ak of hi to β mod γ. Repeating this step until it is
impossible, one can obtain an exponent matrix A to have no two elements having the
leading terms involving the same generator. Then we can switch rows and delete zero
rows (identity element) from A and assume that A is in row echelon form. (Also, one
can replace hi by h
−1
i to make all the leading terms positive.)
Now we transform the row echelon matrix A into a full exponent matrix. Sup-
pose there is a corner entry Aij such that j ∈ I and Aij does not divide mj. Let
α = gcd(Aij,mk) = pAij + qmk and add h
p
i to U as a new element. Then, repeat the
above process to get A back into row echelon form. Repeating this procedure for all
corner entries of A, it now satisfies the second requirement of being full.
In order to satisfy the first requirement, we test, for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, whether
hihjh
−1
i ∈ S(U). If the POLY MEMBER returns false, let u be the last value assigned
to h before the function terminated. Add it to U , then repeat the above procedure
from reducing to the row echelon form. The resulting matrix A is the associated ex-
ponent matrix of V , the polycyclic generating sequence of H. Then, we can apply the
POLY MEMBER function to solve the membership search problem on the subgroup
H.
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Chapter 3
The Nonlinear Decomposition
Attack
Roman’kov [14] suggested the Nonlinear Decomposition Attack as the supplement of
the Linear Decomposition Attack [10], when the platform group does not admit a
faithful linear representation. The Nonlinear Decomposition Attack depends heavily
on efficiently solving the membership search problem on the platform group to de-
compose the secret private key into known elements. In our case, the membership
search problem in polycyclic groups is efficiently solvable [15].
There are three major components for general implementation for the nonlinear
decomposition attack. First we need to find the generating set in which either one
of the two public keys are stored. Then, we solve the membership search problem
for the chosen public key in terms of those generators using properties of polycyclic
groups. Finally, we obtain the shared key using the public key, which is a word of
the generating set. Below, the claims and proofs from the first section “Finding the
Shared Key” are from [14].
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3.1 Finding the Shared Key
Roman’kov proposed a deterministic method of finding a generating set for a public
key. We will analyze the general time complexity on the presented calculations in later
sections. For example, in the protocol proposed by Ko, Lee et al., [9] Alice’s public
key is ga, where g is public. Then, we can generate gA := 〈ga | ga = a−1ga, a ∈ A〉.
3.1.1 Semidirect Product Protocol
While discussing the semidirect-product protocol, denote
gi = φ
i−1(g) · φi−2(g) . . . φ(g) · g.
Lemma 3.1.1. Let G be a group, g an element in G, and φ an endomorphism on G.
Then define H = 〈gi | i ∈ N〉 and gi = φi−1(g) · φi−2(g) . . . φ(g) · g. Assuming that H
is finitely generated and the membership decision problem is solvable in G, there is
an algorithm to find a finite generating set of H in terms of the gi’s.
Proof. Note that 〈g, g1, . . . , gn〉 = 〈g, φ(g), . . . , φn−1(g)〉, since one can apply gi ·
(gi−1)−1 = (φi−1(g) . . . φ(g) · g) · (g−1 · (φ(g))−1 . . . (φi−2(g))−1) = φi−1(g) for any
i ∈ N .
For any l ∈ N, denote Hl = 〈g0, . . . , gl−1〉 = 〈g, φ(g), . . . , φl−1(g)〉. By the assump-
tions above, we can efficiently calculate the minimum number k such that gk+1 ∈ Hk,
meaning Hk+1 = Hk. Thus, there is a group word w of Hk = 〈g, φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g)〉
such that w = φk(g). Then it follows that
φk+1(g) = u(φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g), φk(g))
= u(φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g), w(g, φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g)))
= v(g, φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g))
(3.1)
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for some other group word v(g, φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g)) ∈ Hk. Therefore Hk+n ∈ Hk for all
n ∈ N, and the subgroup stabilizes after a finite number of steps. Then, we have the
generating set {g, φ(g), . . . , φk−1(g)} of Hk.
Now we have either Alice’s or Bob’s public key (suppose from now we have Alice’s)
as a word in (g, g1, . . . , gk). Letting hi = gi−1 where g0 = g, the subgroup Hk above is
equal to 〈h1, . . . , hk〉. We have Alice’s (or Bob’s) public key as a word in (g1, . . . , gk):
gm = u(h1, . . . , hk) =
∏k
j=1 g
j
ij
, where
ij ∈ {i, . . . , k}, j ∈ {1,−1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, k ∈ N.
Then since φij(gn) · gij = φn(gij) · gn,
K = gm+n = φ
n(gm) · gn = φn(
∏k
j=1 g
j
ij
) · gn =
∏k
j=1 φ
n(gij)
j · gn =∏k
j=1(φ
n(gij · gn · g−1n ))j · gn =
∏k
j=1(φ
ij(gn) · gij · g−1n )j · gn,
where all elements gn, gij , j, and φ
ij for ij ∈ {1, . . . , k} are known. Thus, we have
the shared key without solving the underlying problem of finding n ∈ N such that
gn = gm of the platform group.
3.1.2 Ko-Lee Protocol
Lemma 3.1.2. Suppose G is a group and g ∈ G. Assuming the word and membership
search problems are solvable in G and all subgroups are finitely generated in G, there
is an algorithm that finds the generating set of the subgroup gA = 〈ga | a ∈ A〉.
Proof. One can construct an algorithm that eventually terminates to obtain the gen-
erating set, similar to the semidirect product protocol.
Let L0 = g, the known public element. Then let Mi = {a | a ∈ A}, where a is a
word in A = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 of length i. Then, M1 = {a1, a2, . . . , ak, a−11 , a−12 , . . . , a−1k } =
{m1, . . . ,m2k}. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Set some order among the elements in M1.
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2. Iterating in order, test whether each gmj is in the group 〈g, gm1 , . . . , gmj−1〉.
3. After iterating through all elements in M1, one can obtain the subset L1 =
{g, gmj1 , . . . , gmjl} such that gmji /∈ 〈g, gmj1 , . . . , gmji−1 〉
4. If 〈L0〉 6= 〈L1〉, proceed to i = 2
Note that gA = 〈ga | a ∈ A〉 = 〈g ∪ ⋃∞i=1Mi〉. Moreover, since we assume that all
subgroups of G are finitely generated, the process terminates for some n ∈ N, and we
have the generating set Ln such that 〈Ln〉 = gA.
Then, suppose we have gA = 〈gc1 , . . . , gcs〉. Since we assumed that the membership
search problem is solvable, we can obtain ga = w(gc1 , . . . , gcs), where w is a group
word.
Note that since A and B commute element-wise, bci = cib for all 1 ≤ i ≤ s and b ∈ B,
so we have
w((gb)c1 , . . . , (gb)cs) = w(gc1 , . . . , gcs)b = gab = K.
Thus we obtain the shared key without solving the conjugacy search problem of the
platform group.
3.2 Implementation
As mentioned above, the nonlinear decomposition attack is divided up into three
major parts:
• Find the generating set of a public key.
• Solve the membership search problem of the public key within the subgroup.
• Obtain the key from the public key as a word of the generating set of the
subgroup.
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As the membership search problem is described above, we describe finding the gen-
erating set and obtaining the solution in pseudocode to visualize the logistics.
3.2.1 Ko-Lee Protocol
find_generating_set := function(G,A,g);
input
G : public platform group G
A : public subgroup of G
g : public element g
gen_list := [g]; # L_0 in the lemma 3.1.2
exponent_list := [Identity(G)]; #exponent list to keep track of c_i’s
i := 1; # counter for number of iterations.
gen_set_A := Gen(A); # known polycyclic generating set of A
extended := true;
while extended do
prev_subgroup := Subgroup(G,gen_list);
# since we only deal with finite groups, we have a_i^{-1} = a^m for
# some positive m.therefore, we only have a^i elements to test for
# i-th iteration, where a is the number of generating elements of A.
for j in [1..a^i] do
result_word := Identity(G);
result := Identity(G);
# generate words of length i
for k in [1..i] do
new_index := ((j mod Length(gen_set_A)^(k+1)) -
(j mod Length(gen_set_A)^k))
/ Length(gen_set_A)^k;
new_letter := gen_set_A[new_index+1];
result := new_letter*result;
od;
# test whether it extends the subgroup
if not (g^result in Subgroup(G, gen_list)) then
Add(gen_list,g^result);
Add(exponent_list,result);
fi;
od;
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# if the last iteration did not extend the group, break.
if prev_subgroup = Subgroup(G, gen_list) then
extended := false;
fi;
i := i + 1;
od;
return [gen_list,exponent_list];
end;
Note that we keep track of the exponents ci’s of the generating sequence, since we
need to calculate a group word in terms of (gb)ci ’s later when we arrive at the shared
key.
find_key := function(G,gen_set,gm_in_terms_of_gen_set,gn);
input
G : public platform group G
gen_set : generating set (including the exponents) of A
gm : Alice’s key in terms of A’s original generating set
gn : public key of Bob
result := Identity(G);
# K = w((g_b)^c_1,...,(g_b)^c_s)
# gen_set and gm are lists with specified formatting.
for i in [1..Length(gm)] do
result := result * gn^(gen_set[2][gm[i]]);
od;
return result;
end;
3.2.2 Semidirect Product Protocol
The method of finding the generating set of the subgroup containing the public keys
is not much different than the one used in the Ko-Lee Protocol.
find_generating_set := function(G,endomorphism,g);
input
G : the public group G
endomorphism : known endomorphism \phi : G -> G
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g : known public element in G
result_gen_list := [g];
add_gen := Image(endomorphism,g);
cur_gen := add_gen*g;
subgroup := Subgroup(G, result_gen_list);
# While the group is extended by g_{i-1}, proceed to g_i
while not cur_gen in subgroup do
Add(result_gen_list,cur_gen);
subgroup := Subgroup(G, result_gen_list);
add_gen := Image(endomorphism,add_gen);
cur_gen := add_gen*cur_gen;
od;
return result_gen_list;
end;
find_key := function(G,endomorphism,gm_in_gen_set,gn);
input
G : public group G
endomorphism : known endomorphism in G
gm_in_gen_set : Alice’s public key in terms of the gen_set
gn : Bob’s public key
result := Identity(G);
for i in [1..Length(gm_in_gen_set)] do
left := gn;
# \phi^{i_j}(g_n)
for j in [1..gm_in_gen_set[i]] do
left := Image(endomorphism,leftPart);
od;
#the rest of multiplication in the iteration
result := result * (left * gen_set[gm_in_gen_set[i]] * gn^-1);
od;
result := result * gn;
return result;
end;
Note that when the group is finite, negative exponents can be regarded as (−1
mod n), where n is an integer.
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3.3 Time Complexity Analysis
3.3.1 Membership Search Problem
To analyze the efficiency of the nonlinear decomposition attack, one can look at the
worst-case time complexity analysis. Since there are three independent parts in the
nonlinear decomposition attack, we only need to consider the process which requires
the highest complexity. In the analysis we assume G to be a finite polycyclic group.
Consider finding the generating set in the presented protocols, Ko-Lee protocol and
semidirect product protocol. We first consider the complexity of the membership
search problem, then apply it to each protocol to find the general time complexity of
those protocols. We follow the algorithm of solving the membership search problem
in Chapter 2.
First, note that every row operation on the associated exponent matrix requires a
proper collection process. As M.F. Newman and A.C. Niemeyer proposed in [13], the
upper bound of the collection algorithm on G with derived length d and maximum
normal word length N is N3d−1, using collection from the left.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let G = G1 ⊇ G2 ⊇ G3 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Gn−1 ⊇ Gn ⊇ Gn+1 = 1 be
a polycyclic series of G, with (g1, . . . , gn) the polycyclic generating sequence of G.
Assume U is the generating sequence of H and A the associated exponent matrix
of U . Suppose the subgroup H is generated by s elements. Then the total time
complexity of solving the membership search problem on H is O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2)
Proof. The row reduction process is essentially the Euclidean algorithm applied to the
row which has the same generating element as its leading term on the associated ex-
ponent matrix. By [2], the worst case time complexity of Euclid’s algorithm is logϕ(a)
where a is the larger exponent and ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 is the golden ratio. Let b by the
upper bound over all exponents of a collected word in G. Since G can be generated
by n elements, the subgroup of G can have at most n polycyclic generating elements
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by Corollary 2.1.20. Therefore, there can be at most n2 Euclidean Algorithms of
complexity logϕ(b) applied during the row operations, so the time complexity of the
row reduction process is O(n2 logϕ(b)). Then, permuting the rows and replacing the
corner entries with positive terms take at most O(n log(n) + n) = O(n log(n)) steps,
thus the overall complexity remains the same.
Next, we need to make all the corner entries divide mk, the order of the cyclic group
Gk/Gk+1. (Since we assume the group to be finite, there exist such mi’s for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.) Since we again use the extended Euclidean algorithm to calculate
β = gcd(Aij,mk) = pAij + qmk where Aij is a corner entry, its time complexity
is O(logϕ(b)). Then as we add the resulting element exponent vector to the ex-
ponent matrix and repeat the above procedure, we have O(n2 logϕ(b) · logϕ(b)) =
O(n2(logϕ(b))
2).
Then, we need the sequence U to be full. Since there are at most n2 elements on
which to test the first condition (for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ s the set S(U) contains g−1i gjgi)
and n elements on which to test the second condition (if Aij is a corner entry and
j ∈ I, then gqi ∈ S(U) where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and q = mj/Aij), and each test is
done by the POLY MEMBER algorithm. The definition of admissible sequence of
exponents of U , denoted E(U), is the sequence (β1, . . . , βs) of integers such that
if Aij is a corner entry, then 0 ≤ bi < mj/Aij, if i ∈ I. So, the process to ac-
quire h = 1 (h is the tested element after cancellation during POLY MEMBER)
takes at most n(b − 1) cancellations. Thus the time complexity of making U full is
O(n2(nb) + n(nb)) = O(n3b). Moreover, if we add another element not in S(U), we
iterate through the row reduction process again. Therefore the total time complexity
would be O(n3b · n2(logϕ(b))2) = O(n5b(logϕ(b))2).
Since the above procedures are piecewise independent, the total time complexity
of solving the membership search problem is O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2).
28
3.3.2 Ko-Lee Protocol
We need to analyze two steps: finding the generating set of the subgroup gA (or
gB, but assume we are searching for the subgroup containing Alice’s public key) and
finding the shared key.
Claim 3.3.2. Suppose A = {1}, and suppose we add successively other elements
g /∈ 〈A〉 until 〈A〉 = G. Let |G| = pα11 · · · pαnn , where pi’s are distinct primes. Then
the process takes at most α :=
∑n
i=1 αi iterations.
Proof. Let |Gi/Gi+1| = pβi11 · · · pβinn be the prime factorization of the order of Gi/Gi+1.
Then, suppose the new element is in Gj, such that its image of the natural mapping to
Gj/Gj+1 is not the identity. Also, the order of the image in Gj/Gj+1 is some multiple
of those primes p
γj1
1 · · · pγjun where γjl ≤ βjl . Then consider the process on Gj/Gj+1:
Consider the multiset X = {pγj11 , pγj22 , . . . , pγjnn } which means X contains pi exactly
γji times, and γj =
∑n
i=1 γji
z = 1; #z \in G_j/G_{j+1}
gen_set = []; #the obtained generating set of G_j/G_{j+1}
for i in [1..\gamma_j] do
x = Random(X);
X = X - x; # take one element out of X
z = z * x; # multiply z by x
g = element_of_order z; take element of order z in G_j/G_{j+1}
Add(gen_set, z); # add g to gen_set
od;
Since the group is cyclic, any multiplication of the elements in the subgroup generated
by gen set will have order of the least common multiple of those elements, bounded
above by the order of the last element added to the subgroup. Therefore, for all
iterations, because the group is cyclic, none of the new elements are in the previous
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generating set. If the new g is in the subgroup generated by the previous set of
elements, then we arrive at a contradiction, having an element of order greater than
the upper bound provided above. Moreover, the process cannot take more than∑n
i=1 βji steps, since then it means there is at least one step where we add an element
of order equal to another element’s order by the pigeonhole principle. Since the group
is cyclic, this means that we added an element already in the group generated by the
previous elements, which contradicts our assumption.
Thus, this process takes
∑n
i=1 γji iterations for the image of the elements in the
subgroup to fully contain Gj/Gj+1. Moreover,
∑n
i=1 γji = βj, and
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 βij =∑n
i=1 αi = α. Therefore, the maximum iterations required for the images to fully
contain every coset Gi/Gi+1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is α. Therefore, it requires at most α
iterations for the process to terminate.
In finding the generating set of gA, we first set gA0 = {g}, and test for each
iteration starting from i = 1 whether gAi extends Li−1, where gAi = {ga| the word
length of a ≤ i}. Each iteration takes (2a)i membership decision tests, where |A| =
a. So the total number of subgroup membership search tests is bounded above by∑α+1
i=1 (2a)
i where α is the total number of prime factors of |G| as in Claim 3.3.2
(since a ≤ n, the upper bound becomes ∑α+1i=1 (2a)i). Also, each subgroup test has
time complexity of O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2) as well as 2i multiplications for each αi iterations
on ith iteration. The total time complexity of finding the generating set is
O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2(
α+1∑
i=1
2iniN3d−1)) = O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2 · 2α+1n(α+1)N3d−1)
= O(2α+1n5+(α+1)b(logϕ(b))
2N3d−1).
Now, as we are going to solve the membership search problem in a different generating
sequence than the original sequence, in Ko-Lee protocol, we need to keep track of each
polycyclic generating sequence in terms of the original generating set (to calculate
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the shared key). Therefore, in order to analyze the time complexity of the nonlinear
decomposition attack, we need the maximum word length of an element ga ∈ gA in
terms of the original generating set (gc1 , . . . , gcs).
Claim 3.3.3. Suppose we have generating sequence (not necessarily polycyclic) V =
(h1, . . . , hs) of H. Then the maximum length of any element h ∈ H in terms of
those element by converting the sequence and applying the membership search test
is (n2 + n) · bn logϕ(b).
Proof. Noting that there are only additions of g−1i gjgi’s and g
p
i ’s while making the
sequence full, during the POLY MEMBER algorithm, the elementary row operation
that makes the resulting sequence the longest in terms of the original generating
sequence is replacing gi with gig
β
j where β is an integer. In our case, there are a
maximum of n generating elements, and for each step in row reduction, we have
an upper bound of logϕ(b) operations, and each time the β is bounded above by b.
Thus each row reduction process increases the length of the word in terms of the
original generating set of the element represented by the row in the exponent matrix
by blogϕ(b) · li + lj, where li, lj are the word lengths of the elements represented by the
ith and jth rows in terms of the original generating set before the row operation.
Now, consider the last row of the exponent matrix A. Denoting the word length of the
ith row as li, the (i+1)
st row of A will have length blogϕ(b) · li+ li+1, by induction. Thus
the last (nth) row will have length at most bn logϕ(b) + ln = b
n logϕ(b) + 1 ≈ bn logϕ(b).
Then, we ensure each corner entry Aij divides mj by multiplying integers, bound
by b. To finalize and make A full, we apply the POLY MEMBER algorithm of
n2 + n elements on S(U), and in the worst case, n2 + n elements will be added to
the sequence V over the process. As a result, there will be n2 + n additional row
reduction iterations. Therefore, the upper bound of the word length of an element in
the generating sequence in terms of the original generating set is (n2+n)·bn logϕ(b).
31
(We noticed during the test cases, even for fairly small b’s, that putting the words
in terms of the generating set often required large amount of memory and was a severe
restriction on testing the algorithm.)
Finally, we need to calculate the shared key. The shared key calculation is fairly
simple, as it only needs to calculate the conjugation (gb)ci , where 〈gci〉 = gA. The
maximum number of generating element for gA is α, and each conjugation is two
multiplications, which is equivalent to two collection processes. Also, the maximum
word length of a ∈ A in terms of gci is, by Claim 3.3.3, (n2 + n) · bn logϕ(b), so two
collections for each gci in the word. Therefore we need 2 · (n2 +n) · bn logϕ(b) collection
processes, which equals to 2 · (n2 + n) · bn logϕ(b) ·N3d−1 = O(n2bn logϕ(b)N3d−1).
In summation, the overall attack has time complexity of
O(2α+1n5+(α+1)b(logϕ(b))
2N3d−1 + (n2 + n) · bn logϕ(b) + n2bn logϕ(b)N3d−1)
= O(2α+1n5+(α+1)b(logϕ(b))
2N3d−1 + n2bn logϕ(b)N3d−1).
3.3.3 Semidirect Product Based Protocol
On this protocol, note that gi = φ
i−1(g) · · · · · φ(g) · g By Claim 3.3.2, we need a
maximum of
∑n
i=1 αi = α iterations, provided that |G| = pα11 · · · pαnn , to obtain the
generating set of the subgroup containing Alice and Bob’s key. Note that since the
public endomorphism φ is operation-preserving, we have φ(g) = φ(u(g1, . . . , gn)) =
u(φ(g1), . . . , φ(gn)). Also, the generating elements gi’s can be mapped to any element
with word length bounded above by nb, and the word length of all φj(g)’s are bounded
above by N , the maximum normal word length. In each step, the maximum length
of the image of the public element φi(g) after the endomorphism φ is bounded above
by N2. To collect the elements, we need to apply N collections, each taking at most
N3d−1 steps.
The ith iteration has some basic steps:
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• Calculate φi−1(g). This can be done efficiently by applying the endomorphism
once on φi−2(g) from the previous step.
• Multiply the calculated φi−1(g) by the previously calculated gi−1 to obtain gi.
• Apply the subgroup test to see if gi extends the subgroup generated by {g, g1, . . . , gi−1}.
• If the subgroup is extended, proceed to (i+ 1)st iteration.
First, we have φi−2(g) already collected. Therefore, we need to compute N ·N3d−1 to
get φi−1(g) in a collected form. Then we multiply φi−1(g) and gi−1, taking at most
N3d−1 steps, and apply POLY MEMBER on the resulting element gi, which takes
O(n5b(logϕ(b))
2) time. Then we add it to the subgroup, depending on whether it
extends the group. The total time complexity of each step is then bounded above by
(1 +N)N3d−1 +n5b(logϕ(b))
2. Therefore, the number of steps of the whole procedure
is bounded above by α((1 +N)N3d−1 + n5b(logϕ(b))
2).
After solving the membership search problem for Alice’s key gm, we calculate the
shared key by
k∏
j=1
(φij(gn) · gij · g−1n )j · gn,
where gm =
∏k
j=1 g
j
ij
.
The number ij is bounded above by α, the number of iterations taken to find the
generating set. Since we can calculate and store φij(g)’s, it takes α · (1 +N)N3d−1 to
calculate and store those elements. Then since the upper bound of word length in the
subgroup H = 〈gi|i ∈ {1, . . . , α}〉 is bounded above by (n2 + n)bn logϕ(b), we have k ≤
(n2+n)bn logϕ(b). Therefore the complexity of finding the shared key for the semidirect
product protocol is bounded above by α((1 + N)N3d−1 + n5b(logϕ(b))
2)) + (n2 +
n)bn logϕ(b)(2N3d−1)+N3d−1 = (α(1+N)+2(n2+n)bn logϕ(b)+1)N3d−1+αn5b(logϕ(b))
2).
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3.4 Test Results
The test results were done in a linux OpenSUSE machine, Dell Optiplex 9020 with
an Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM .
Ko-Lee protocol was used as the testing. The platform group G was P wrC2, where
P was a Heisenberg Group of order p3 and Zp as the field for each entry.
The time measurements are average time in 100 trials with random public element g,
Alice’s public key, and Bob’s public key to calculate the shared key.
p Alice and Bob Eve
5 ∼0(ms) 15.92(ms)
7 ∼0 38.56
11 ∼0 719.44
13 ∼0 5112.64 ( 5 sec)
17 ∼0 11982.76
19 ∼0 23941.04
23 ∼1/4 113164.88 ( 2 min)
29 ∼1/4 907250.44
31 ∼1/4 626605.6
37 ∼1/4 3090570.68( 45 min)
41 ∼1/2 3304778.24 ( 50 min)
Note that the computation time for Eve, the adversary, does not consistently grow
in accordance with p, and the group order |G|, most apparent between p = 29 and
p = 31. The reason was quite unclear, but we noticed that for a few of the test cases
the computation time were much longer than the average of all test cases. Observing
the relations among the elements a, b, and g could be the way to find the source of
the difference, but it was not apparent why there were so much gap between some
test cases and the others.
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Chapter 4
Future Research
4.1 More Platform Groups
Even though we only tested for some specific polycyclic groups, the process of imple-
menting and testing the nonlinear decomposition attack on other types of polycyclic
groups should not be much different. As the nonlinear decomposition attack depends
largely on the membership search problem of the group, any group with an efficient
membership search problem would be vulnerable under nonlinear decomposition at-
tack, if it is used as a platform group for a conjugacy problem based cryptosystem.
4.2 Better Upper Bounds
Since we only assumed the worst case on analyzing the complexity of these algorithms,
one could easily apply more constraints and come up with a better upper bound for
the computational complexity of the attack.
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Appendix A
Group Theory
A.1 Commutator Subgroups
Since polycyclic groups are strongly related to the derived series and the lower central
series, below are some of the relevant propositions and properties of those series
from [15]. Note: The derived subgroup of G is the group [G,G]
Proposition A.1.1. The derived subgroup G′ is normal in G and the quotient G/G′
is abelian in G. If N E G and N is abelian in G, then N ⊇ G′.
Remark A.1.2. Suppose H1, H2, K1, K2 ⊆ G such that H1 ⊆ H2 and K1 ⊆ K2. Then
[H1, K1] ⊆ [H2, K2].
Corollary A.1.3. If H ⊆ G, then H(i) ⊆ G(i) and γi(H) ⊆ γi(G).
Proof. Apply induction on the above proposition.
Proposition A.1.4. If f : G1 → G2 is a group homomorphism, then [f(H), f(K)] =
f([H,K]) for all H,K ⊆ G
Corollary A.1.5. If f : G1 → G2 is a group homomorphism, then f(G)(i) = f(G(i))
and γi(f(G1)) = f(γi(G2))
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Proof. Applying induction on the above proposition.
Corollary A.1.6. If N E G and g is the natural homomorphism from G to G/N .
Then g([H,K]) = [g(H), g(K)]
Proposition A.1.7. If H,K E G, then [H,K] E G and [H,K] ⊆ H ∩K.
Proposition A.1.8. For any elements x, y, z ∈ G, the following hold.
• [xy, z] = [x, z][x, z, y][y, z]
• [x, yz] = [x, z][x, y][x, y, z]
• [x, y−1, z]y[y, z−1, x]z[z, x−1, y]x = 1
Proposition A.1.9. If H,K,L ⊆ G and N E G such that [K,L,H], [L,H,K] ⊆ N ,
then [H,K,L] ⊆ N .
Proposition A.1.10. For all i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 1,[γi(G), γj(G)] ⊆ γi+j(G).
Corollary A.1.11. G(i) ⊆ γ2i(G) for all i ≥ 0.
A.2 Implementation of the Membership Search Al-
gorithm
word_solve_new := function(G, gen_set, gm) ;
result := [];
H := Subgroup(G, gen_set);
MyFreeGroup := FreeGroup(Length(gen_set));
gen_bundle := IgsParallel(gen_set, GeneratorsOfGroup(MyFreeGroup));
gen_elems := gen_bundle[1];
gen_reference := gen_bundle[2];
h := gm;
while not h=Identity(G) do
h_exp := GenExpList(h);
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for i in [1..Length(gen_elems)] do
if GenExpList(gen_elems[i])[1] = h_exp[1] then
w := gen_elems[i];
index := i;
break;
fi;
od;
exp := 0;
for j in [1..Order(GeneratorsOfGroup(G)[h_exp[1]])] do
if Order(GeneratorsOfGroup(G)[h_exp[1]]) <> infinity then
exp := (exp + GenExpList(w)[2])
mod Order(GeneratorsOfGroup(G)[h_exp[1]]);
else
exp := (exp + GenExpList(w)[2]);
fi;
if exp = GenExpList(h)[2] then
exp := j;
break;
fi;
od;
v := w^(exp);
h := v^-1*h;
Add(result,index);
Add(result,exp);
od;
# converting the format according to LetterRepAssocWord format
result2 := [];
for o in [1..(Length(result)/2)] do
index := (o*2) - 1;
for p in [1..result[index+1]] do
Add(result2, LetterRepAssocWord(gen_reference[result[index]]));
od;
od;
result := Flat(result2);
return result;
end;
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